Consensus Formation on Simple and Complex Networks

T.Antal, V. Sood

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100th!!! Statistical Mechanics Meeting, Rutgers, December 2008

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
The classic voter model & its cousins

Voting on complex networks


new conservation law two time-scale route to consensus short consensus time

Extensions


zealotry, vacillation, strategic voting (>2 states)




0. Binary voter variable at each site i, $\sigma_i = \pm I$




0. Binary voter variable at each site i, $\sigma_i = \pm 1$ 1. Pick a random voter




0. Binary voter variable at each site i, $\sigma_i = \pm I$ 1. Pick a random voter 2. Assume state of randomly-selected neighbor




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- 0. Binary voter variable at each site i, $\sigma_i = \pm 1$
- I. Pick a random voter
- 2. Assume state of randomly-selected neighbor individual has no self-confidence & adopts neighbor's state
- 3. Repeat 1 & 2 until consensus necessarily occurs in a finite system

lemming

Voter Model: Tell me how to vote



Voter Model: Tell me how to vote

Invasion Process: I tell you how to vote



lemming



Voter Model: Tell me how to vote

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Link Dynamics:

Pick two disagreeing agents and change one at random







Voter Model: Tell me how to vote

Invasion Process: I tell you how to vote

Link Dynamics:

Pick two disagreeing agents and change one at random

identical on regular lattices, distinct on random graphs Suchecki, Eguiluz & San Miguel (2005), Castellano (2005), Sood & SR (2005)








Voter Model on Lattices: 3 Basic PropertiesI. Final State (Exit) Probability $\mathcal{E}(\rho_0)$


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


average magnetization is conserved!

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Voter Model on Lattices: 3 Basic Properties I. Final State (Exit) Probability $\mathcal{E}(\rho_0) = \rho_0$ Evolution of a single active link:



Voter Model on Lattices: 3 Basic Properties 2. Spatial Dependence of 2-Spin Correlations (infinite system)

$$\frac{\partial c_2(\mathbf{r},t)}{\partial t} = \nabla^2 c_2(\mathbf{r},t)$$


$$c_2(r=0,t) = 1$$

 $c_2(r>0,t=0) = 0$


$$\frac{\partial c_2(\mathbf{r},t)}{\partial t} = \nabla^2 c_2(\mathbf{r},t) \qquad \begin{array}{c} c_2 \\ c_2 \end{array}$$

$$c_2(r=0,t) = 1$$


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
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
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
3. System Size Dependence of Consensus Time Liggett (1985), Krapivsky (1992)

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
 $\int c(r,t)r^{d-1} dr = N$

dimension	consensus time
Ι	N ²
2	N In N
>2	N


Suchecki, Eguiluz & San Miguel (2005) Antal, Sood, SR (2005, 06, 08)




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


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"flow" from high degree to low degree

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
degree-weighted Ist moment:

$$\omega_1 = \frac{1}{N\mu_1} \sum_x k_x \,\eta(x)$$

conserved!


Invasion Process on Heterogeneous Networks

Castellano (2005) Antal, Sood, SR (2005, 06, 08)



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
Castellano (2005) Antal, Sood, SR (2005, 06, 08)



"flow" from low degree to high degree

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
degree-weighted inverse moment

$$\omega_{-1} = \frac{1}{N\mu_{-1}} \sum_{x} k_x^{-1} \eta(x) \text{ conserved!}$$


Voter Model Exit Probability on Complex Graphs

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
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
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
Route to Consensus on Complex Networks two-time-scale trajectory




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Molloy-Reed Scale-Free Network




Consensus Time Evolution Equation



backward Kolmogorov equation:


Consensus Time Evolution Equation



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 $T_i = p_1(T_{i_1} + 1) + p_2(T_{i_2} + 1) + p_3(T_{i_3} + 1)$

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 $\longrightarrow \nabla^2 T = -N_{\text{eff}} F(\text{initial location})$

Voter model:

$$T_N \sim \begin{cases} N & \nu > 3, \\ N/\ln N & \nu = 3, \\ N^{(2\nu - 4)/(\nu - 1)} & 2 < \nu < 3, \\ (\ln N)^2 & \nu = 2, \\ \mathcal{O}(1) & \nu < 2. \end{cases}$$

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Invasion process:

$$T_N \sim \begin{cases} N & \nu > 2, \\ N \ln N & \nu = 2, \\ N^{2-\nu} & \nu < 2. \end{cases}$$

Voter model:

paradigmatic, soluble, (but hopelessly naive)

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new conservation law meandering route to consensus fast consensus for voter model

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zealots, vacillation, strategic voting

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Still to be done:

empirical connections & predictions

see e.g., "Scaling & University in Proportional Elections" Fortunato & Castellano, PRL (2007)