# Consensus Formation on Simple and Complex Networks 

T.Antal, V. Sood<br>Sid Redner (physics.bu.edu/~redner)

I00th!!! Statistical Mechanics Meeting, Rutgers, December 2008

# Consensus Formation on Simple and Complex Networks <br> T.Antal, V. Sood <br> Sid Redner (physics.bu.edu/~redner) 

I 00th!!! Statistical Mechanics Meeting, Rutgers, December 2008
The classic voter model \& its cousins
Voting on complex networks
new conservation law
two time-scale route to consensus
short consensus time
Extensions
zealotry, vacillation, strategic voting (>2 states)

Classic Voter Model Coliford \& Susubur( 1975 T)

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2.Assume state of randomly-selected neighbor individual has no self-confidence \& adopts neighbor's state
3. Repeat I \& 2 until consensus necessarily occurs in a finite system

Voter Model \& Cousins

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lemming

## Voter Model:

Tell me how to vote

## Voter Model \& Cousins

lemming

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Invasion Process: | tell you how to vote


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Invasion Process:

## Link Dynamics:

I tell you how to vote
Tell me how to vote


Pick two disagreeing agents and change one at random
lemming


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lemming

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Tell me how to vote

## Link Dynamics:

Pick two disagreeing agents and change one at random

identical on regular lattices, distinct on random graphs Suchecki, Eguiluz \& San Miguel (2005), Castellano (2005), Sood \& SR (2005)

Voter Model on Lattices: 3 Basic Properties
I. Final State (Exit) Probability $\mathcal{E}\left(\rho_{0}\right)$

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## I. Final State (Exit) Probability $\mathcal{E}\left(\rho_{0}\right)=\rho_{0}$

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## 2. Spatial Dependence of 2-Spin Correlations <br> (infinite system)

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 Equation of motion:(infinite system)

$$
\frac{\partial c_{2}(\mathbf{r}, t)}{\partial t}=\nabla^{2} c_{2}(\mathbf{r}, t)
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\begin{aligned}
& c_{2}(r=0, t)=1 \\
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steady state

coarsening

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## 3. System Size Dependence of Consensus Time <br> Liggett (I985), Krapivsky (I992)

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$$
\int^{\sqrt{D t}} c(r, t) r^{d-1} d r=N
$$

| dimension | consensus time |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1 | $\mathrm{~N}^{2}$ |
| 2 | $\mathrm{~N} \ln \mathrm{~N}$ |
| $>2$ | N |

## Voter Model on Complex Networks

Suchecki, Eguiluz \& San Miguel (2005)
Antal, Sood, SR $(2005,06,08)$


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"flow" from high degree to Iow degree
degree-weighted $\quad \omega_{1}=\frac{1}{N \mu_{1}} \sum_{x} k_{x} \eta(x) \quad$ conserved!
Ist moment:

Invasion Process on Heterogeneous Networks
Castellano (2005)
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$\begin{gathered}\text { degree-weighted } \\ \text { inverse moment }\end{gathered} \quad \omega_{-1}=\frac{1}{N \mu_{-1}} \sum_{x} k_{x}^{-1} \eta(x)$ conserved!

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\mathcal{E}(\omega)=\omega
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Extreme case: star graph N nodes: degree I I node: degree N


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N nodes: degree I I node: degree $N$

$$
\omega=\frac{1}{N \mu_{1}} \sum_{x} k_{x} \eta(x)=\frac{1}{2}
$$

Final state: all I with prob. I/2!

Route to Consensus on Complex Networks two-time-scale trajectory

complete bipartite graph


Route to Consensus on Complex Networks two-time-scale trajectory


two-clique graph

$\mathrm{N}=10000, \mathrm{C}$ links/node

## Molloy-Reed Scale-Free Network



## Consensus Time Evolution Equation


backward Kolmogorov equation:

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$$
T_{i}=p_{1}\left(T_{i_{1}}+1\right)+p_{2}\left(T_{i_{2}}+1\right)+p_{3}\left(T_{i_{3}}+1\right)
$$

## Consensus Time Evolution Equation


backward Kolmogorov equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
T_{i} & =p_{1}\left(T_{i_{1}}+1\right)+p_{2}\left(T_{i_{2}}+1\right)+p_{3}\left(T_{i_{3}}+1\right) \\
& \longrightarrow \nabla^{2} T=-N_{\mathrm{eff}} F(\text { initial location })
\end{aligned}
$$

# Consensus Time for Power-Law Degree <br> Distribution $n_{k} \sim k^{-\nu}$ 

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Distribution $n_{k} \sim k^{-\nu}$
Voter model:

$$
T_{N} \sim \begin{cases}N & \nu>3, \\ N / \ln N & \nu=3, \\ N^{(2 \nu-4) /(\nu-1)} & 2<\nu<3, \\ (\ln N)^{2} & \nu=2, \\ \mathcal{O}(1) & \nu<2 .\end{cases}
$$

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fast
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Invasion process:

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T_{N} \sim \begin{cases}N & \nu>2 \\ N \ln N & \nu=2 \\ N^{2-\nu} & \nu<2\end{cases}
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Voter model:
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Still to be done:
empirical connections \& predictions
see e.g.,"Scaling \& University in Proportional Elections" Fortunato \& Castellano, PRL (2007)

